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Abstract
We study common agency problems in which principals (groups) make costly commit-
ments to incentives that are conditioned on imperfect signals of the agent’s action. Our
framework allows for incentives to be either rewards or punishments and an equilibrium al-
ways exists. For our canonical example with two principals we obtain a unique equilibrium,
which typically involves randomization by both principals. Greater similarity between prin-
cipals leads to more aggressive competition. The principals weakly prefer punishment to
rewards, sometimes strictly. With rewards an agent voluntarily joins both groups; with pun-
ishment it depends on whether severe punishments are feasible and cheap for the principals.
We study whether introducing an attractive compromise reduces competition between prin-
cipals. Our framework of imperfect monitoring offers a natural perturbation of the standard
common agency model, which results in sharper equilibrium predictions. The limit equilib-
rium prediction provides support to both truthful equilibria and the competing notion of
natural equilibria, which unlike the former may be inefficient.
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No one can serve two masters, for either he will hate the one and love the other, or he
will be devoted to the one and despise the other. Matthew 6:24.
1. Introduction
We study common agency problems where the agent may be rewarded or punished
for what he does, and the level of punishment or reward is determined by the principals’
effort. Effort, and therefore both rewards and punishments, is costly to the principals. A
prototypical situation we have in mind is that of two groups competing for the indivisible
effort of a member of both groups: for example to attend a rally for or against a referendum,
or to vote with one party or the other. For example, you might be Catholic and a Democrat,
and the Catholics say vote for the anti-abortion candidate and the Democrats say vote
for the pro-abortion candidate. What do you do? How do the groups optimally provide
incentives in the presence of a competing group? Typically social groups provide incentives
not only through costly rewards but also through costly punishments. For instance, you
may value your social connections with both groups, and both can threaten to deny you the
benefits of belonging if you do not do as they say. The existing literature focuses on costly
rewards, and when punishments take place they typically are not costly to the principal but
instead constitute a transfer from the agent to the principal.
The other key component of our analysis is imperfect monitoring of the agent’s action.
Besides the practical fact that noise is always present this creates punishment costs on the
equilibrium path and avoids the degenerate possibility that principals pile on punishment
that will never take place. In our setup principals commit to incentives that are conditioned
on imperfect signals of the agent’s action. Combined with costly effort this means that the
“losing” principal pays something and typically implies that equilibria must involve mixed
strategies. This is in contrast to the standard common agency model which focuses on pure
strategy equilibria.
Our canonical example examines the case of two principals with the agent choosing one
of three actions. One of these constitutes inaction, the other two favor one or the other
principal. In sharp contrast to the common agency literature, the equilibrium prediction
under all parameter configurations is unique. For parameter values that lead to both prin-
cipals actively competing, the equilibrium is in mixed strategies. Irrespective of whether
effort translates into reward or punishment, making the principals more similar leads to
more aggressive competition. The principal with the lower willingness to pay, dubbed dis-
advantaged, does not care whether incentives are provided in the form of punishments or
rewards. By contrast the advantaged principal never prefers rewards to punishment and
sometimes strictly prefers punishment. The welfare implication for the agent is more sub-
tle: we focus on analyzing which groups the agent would choose to join. With rewards he
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would join both. With punishments, it depends on a variety of factors such as the signal
technology, the principals’ valuations and the intensity with which effort gets translated
to punishment. The outcomes span the entire spectrum from joining both to none to, in
specific scenarios, only the advantaged principal but also, more surprisingly at first sight,
only the disadvantaged principal. In particular, we find that if punishments are limited
to exclusion from the benefits of joining a principal then both groups are joined, while if
severe punishments are possible at low cost we are in the biblical case described above - the
competition between the two principals to punish the agent is so ruinous that it never pays
to join both.
We then study two variations on the canonical example. First we ask whether compro-
mise by the agent can mitigate the severity of competition between the principals. In the
canonical example described above there is a compromise action (inaction) but the princi-
pals can only observe whether the agent took their favored action or not and in the latter
case they cannot tell if the action taken was inaction or favored the other principal. Further,
inaction brings the principals no payoff. As a result such a compromise is not observed in
equilibrium. Hence we ask: with a more favorable signal structure for detecting that the
agent compromised and better payoffs will the principals induce compromise? If the signal
is strong enough we show that this is indeed the case.
Lastly, we investigate how the canonical example relates to the standard common agency
literature. Our assumption of imperfect monitoring allows a natural perturbation of com-
plete information common agency (rewards-only) games and a game theoretic formalization
of the Bernheim and Whinston (1986a) idea of “serious” strategies.4 This results in a sharp
equilibrium selection and a strategic foundation for truthful equilibria. Interestingly, it also
provides support and a strategic foundation to a competing class of equilibria, natural equi-
libria, introduced by Kirchsteiger and Prat (2001), which unlike truthful equilibria may be
inefficient. This makes the case that such inefficiencies may be fundamental to common
agency games such as lobbying. This is in contrast to the extensive theoretical as well as
empirical literature that takes the efficiency of complete information lobbying for granted
due to their reliance on truthful strategies.5
2. The Model
We consider a common agency problem. There is one agent who chooses actions from a
finite set a ∈ A. There are principals k = 1, 2, . . . ,K. Each principal has access to a finite
4The relationship between “serious” strategies, truthful equilibria and our perturbation is discussed in
detail in section 5
5See, for instance, Persson (1998), Grossman and Helpman (1994), Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997),
Rama and Tabellini (1998), Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Marceau and Smart (2003) .
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set of random signals zk ∈ Zk about the agent’s action. The signal profile z = (z1, . . . , zK)
is distributed according to pi(z|a). Each principal makes an effort choice φk ∈ Φk a compact
convex subset of Euclidean space.6
The agent has a cost of taking actions c(a) ≥ 0 where for some a ∈ A the cost c(a) = 0.
The agent also receives a scalar punishment from each principal based on the signals and
efforts chosen by that principal. This is given by a continuous function P k(φk, zk). These
punishments may be negative, representing rewards. The overall utility of the agent is then
U(a, φ) = −c(a)−∑z∈Z∑k pi(z|a)P k(φk, zk). Each principal receives a utility vk(a) from
the agents action and pays a cost given by a continuous function Dk(φk, zk) ≥ 0 based
on the signals and effort chosen. The overall utility of the principal is then V k(a, φk) =
vk(a)−∑z∈Z pi(z|a)Dk(φk, zk)
Play is sequential. In the initial period principals move simultaneously and choose mixed
strategies F k that are measures over choices of effort (pure strategies). Their realizations
φk, k = 1, . . . ,K are observed by the agent, who then chooses an action a ∈ A. In the third
and final period principals receive the noisy signals zk about how agent played and utility
is determined accordingly.
An optimal response for the agent is a probability distribution α(φ) over A that is
measurable as a function of the strategy profile φ and such that α(φ)[a] > 0 implies a ∈
arg maxb U(b, φ).
A subgame perfect equilibrium is an optimal response for the agent α and a strategy
F k for each principal that is optimal given α. We refer to this game as the basic game.
2.1. Existence and Continuity of Equilibrium
Since agent utility U(a, φ) and principal utility V k(a, φk) are continuous in a, φ, pi we
get the following upper hemicontinuity result.
Lemma 1. Suppose φn → φ, αn → α and that pin → pi are such that αn is an optimal
response at n. Then
1. α is optimal with respect to φ, pi
2. V k(φn, αn)→ V k(φ, α)
Proof. (1) is due to the maximum theorem, which ensures that the set of optimal responses
is upper hemicontinuous. (2) then follows immediately due to continuity.
Theorem 1. An equilibrium of the basic game exists. If pin → pi and F kn are a sequence
of equilibrium distributions for the principals for n that converge weakly to F k then there
6Note that since the effort space can be multidimensional this formalism allows us to study the case
where the principal chooses a signal dependent schedule of efforts.
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is an equilibrium of the game with respect to pi in which the equilibrium distribution for the
principals is F and in which the equilibrium utilities converge.
Notice that there is no assertion about convergence of the strategies for the agent.
Proof. First we show that the utility correspondence V k(φ) which assigns each φ the set
of vectors of principals’ utility corresponding to some optimal agent play is upper hemi-
continuous. Consider a sequence φm → φ and xm → x with xm ∈ V (φm). We need to
show that x ∈ V (φ). Let αm be such that xm = V (φm, αm). Since the set of agent mixed
strategies is compact, the sequence αm must have a convergent subsequence, say αn, with
αn → α. Recall that αn is an optimal response at n. So we have the subsequence φn, xn
where xn = V k(φn, αn). Then by Lemma 1 we have limxn = V k(φ, α) ∈ V (φ). Finally
note that since xm → x it must be that x = limxn, and so x ∈ V (φ), as required.
V k(φ) is obviously bounded and convex valued. Hence by Simon and Zame (1990) an
equilibrium exists. We can leverage their corollary that sequences of equilibria converge
to equilibria to prove that the equilibrium correspondence is upper hemicontinuous with
respect to the signal distribution pi. We do that by introducing an artificial additional
principal called nature who chooses pi and is completely indifferent.
The generality of this existence result is very helpful for our analysis. Even under
parameter configurations which make explicit construction of equilibrium strategies difficult,
it preserves the possibility of characterizing and discussing the properties of such equilibria,
sure of their existence. Nevertheless, the model is far too general for our purposes. For a
sharper picture of the implications of competing groups acting as principals with a common
agent we focus henceforth on the special case of two principals with conflicting interests on
the agent’s actions.
3. Canonical Example
There are two principals k = 1, 2. The agent can take three actions A = {0, 1, 2}. Action
0 represents inaction and is worth 0 = vk(0) = c(0) to both principals and to the agent.
For k ∈ {1, 2}, we define −k as the element of {1, 2} such that −k 6= k. The action k 6= 0 is
worth vk(k) = νk > 0 to principal k and action −k is worth vk(−k) = 0 so that principal k
prefers the action k. Each principal k chooses effort φk ∈ [0,Φk]. We assume that ν1 > ν2
and Φ1 > Φ2 and call principal 1 the advantaged principal. The action k 6= 0 costs c(k) = c
to the agent.
Our basic assumption is signal symmetry between the two principals and that each
principal can tell whether his preferred action is taken, but if it is not cannot tell what other
action the agent might have taken. Specifically, each principal receives an independently
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drawn signal zk ∈ {0, 1} where the probability of receiving the “bad” signal 1 when the
agent chooses the action k is pi(zk = 1|k) = pi > 0 and the probability of receiving the
signal 1 when the agent chooses action j 6= k is 1 > pi(zk = 1| − k) = pi(zk = 1|0) = pib > pi.
We consider two cases: in the punishment case principal k’s effort results in a punishment
to the agent of P k(φk, 1) = λφk when the bad signal 1 is received and P k(φk, 0) = 0 when
the good signal 0 is received; in the reward case φk results in a reward of −P k(φk, 0) = λφk
when the good signal 0 is received and of P k(φk, 1) = 0 when the bad signal 1 is received.
The term λ > 0 captures the intensity with which effort gets converted into reward or
punishment.
We may use µ ∈ {0, 1} as an indicator of the punishment case with µ = 1 meaning the
punishment case so that on the good signal 0 there is a reward of (1 − µ)λφk and on the
bad signal 1 a punishment of µλφk is issued.7 hence the expected effort cost to principal k
if the agent takes action a is given by[
µpi(zk = 1|a) + (1− µ)pi(zk = 0|a)
]
φk.
Consequently the overall expected utility of principal k if the agent takes action k is νk −
[(1− pi)(1− µ) + piµ]φk; for actions −k and 0 it is −[(1− pib)(1− µ) + pibµ]φk. The amount
received by the agent from principal k for taking action a is (1 − µ)pi(zk = 0|a)λφk −
µpi(zk = 1|a)λφk. Hence the overall expected utility of the agent for the action k 6= 0 is
(1 − pi)(1 − µ)λφk − piµλφk + (1 − pib)(1 − µ)λφ−k − pibµλφ−k − c and for action 0 it is
[(1− pib)(1− µ)− pibµ]λ(φk + φ−k).
3.1. Agent Incentives
Because the effect of effort by the two principals is symmetric, between actions 1 and
2 the agent prefers the action of the principal k who provides the greater effort. Suppose
the efforts are φk ≥ φ−k. When does the agent prefer choosing k to inaction? The utility
advantage of action k over the action 0 is
(1− pi)(1− µ)λφk − piµλφk + (1− pib)(1− µ)λφ−k − pibµλφ−k − c
− [(1− pib)(1− µ)− pibµ]λ(φk + φ−k)
7Conceptually there is no reason a principal should not be able to reward a bad signal and punish a good
signal. However in the first stage game, that is, given agent optimal play in the second stage, not rewarding
the bad signal or not punishing the good signal strictly reduces costs and regardless of the strategy of the
other principal cannot increase the probability the agent takes a less favorable action. Hence strategies of
rewarding on bad or punishing on good signals are strictly dominated in the first stage game and so are
irrelevant.
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which may be written as
(1− pi)(1− µ)λφk − piµλφk − c− [(1− pib)(1− µ)− pibµ]λφk.
This does not depend on φ−k, because the amount of punishment or reward from principal
−k is the same whether the agent chooses action k or 0. From the expression above it
follows that the agent strictly prefers inaction if and only if the efforts of both principals
fall below a threshold
φk < c/ [λ(pib − pi)] ≡ ϕ, k = 1, 2.
Notice that the agent prefers inaction if the principals’ effort levels are low independently
of µ. This is why the equilibria in the theorem of the next section share fundamental features
in the rewards and punishments cases. We comment on the differences after stating the
result.
3.2. Principals’ Willingness to Pay
Observe that principal k’s marginal cost of providing effort when the agent chooses the
preferred option k is γ ≡ (1−pi)(1−µ)+piµ. The most effort principal k is willing and able
to choose to get the preferred outcome k over any other outcome is W k = min{Φk, νk/γ}.
We refer to this as principal k’s willingness. Notice that Φ1 > Φ2 and ν1 > ν2 imply
W 1 > W 2 : the advantaged principal has a strictly higher willingness.
3.3. The Unique Equilibrium
The canonical example delivers precise predictions under all parameter configurations.
We summarize these in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. The canonical example has a unique equilibrium.
a) If W 1 < ϕ, the principals choose 0 effort and the agent chooses inaction.
b) If W 1 > ϕ > W 2, the disadvantaged principal chooses 0 effort, the advantaged
principal chooses ϕ and the agent chooses 1.
c) If W 2 > ϕ, equilibrium is in mixed strategies; it has support {0} ∪ [ϕ,W 2], the
disadvantaged principal gets v2 = 0 and the advantaged principal gets v1 = ν1 − γW 2 =
ν1−min{ν2, γΦ2} > 0. In this equilibrium action 0 is not used. The cumulative distribution
of effort level is
F k(φk) =
v−k + µφk
ν−k + (µ− γ)φk
for φk ∈ [ϕ,W 2), with F 2(0) = F 2(ϕ), F 1(0) = 0 and F k(W 2) = 1− limφk→W 2 F k(φk).
Proof. If W 1 < ϕ, then both principals optimally select 0, irrespective of the other’s choice.
The agent’s choice in equilibrium must therefore be inaction.
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If W 1 > ϕ > W 2 principal 1 can guarantee a = 1 by choosing effort ϕ since W 2 is lower
than that. Since the disadvantaged principal would never select positive effort in equilibrium
in this case, the unique equilibrium must involve the advantaged principal selecting ϕ and
the agent choosing 1.
Now consider the case of W 2 > ϕ. The key thing is that any bid below ϕ must be at 0,
the reason being that for any φk < ϕ principal k gets zero (the agent will choose either−k
or 0) and if φk > 0 the bid costs [(1− pib)(1− µ) + pibµ]φk > 0.
The remainder of the argument is a standard all-pay auction argument. Nobody bids
more than the “top” W 2 = min{Φ2, ν2/γ}. There cannot be a positive probability of a tie
below the top: one of the two should raise the atom slightly. There cannot be a gap (zero
probability interval) at or above ϕ since then it would pay one to shift bids from the top of
the gap to the bottom. Since bidding then has to go all the way down to ϕ one has to get
zero . It must be the disadvantaged principal since the advantaged principal can guarantee
a positive return by bidding just above the top. The disadvantaged principal getting zero
forces bidding to the top, since otherwise there is a positive return by bidding a bit above
the maximum bid.
We can then work out the equilibrium strategies. The indifference condition for k and
bids at and above ϕ is given by F−k(φk)(νk − γφk)− (1− F−k(φk))µφk = vk so that
F−k(φk) =
vk + µφk
νk + (µ− γ)φk .
The disadvantaged principal must get 0 from bidding 0 so must lose for sure, meaning that
the advantaged principal never bids 0. From this it easily follows that
F 2(0) = F 2(ϕ) =
λ(pib − pi)v1 + µc
λ(pib − pi)ν1 + (µ− γ)c .
Note that there is an atom at ϕ for the advantaged principal of
F 1(ϕ) =
µc
λ(pib − pi)ν2 + (µ− γ)c
when µ = 1. When µ = 0, the advantaged principal has an atom at W 2 with probability
1− limφ1→W 2 F 1(φ1)
Furthermore, inaction happens with 0 probability.
Notice that the uniqueness result we obtain here is in sharp contrast to the unwieldy
multiplicity typical of common agency games. So, our subsequent results do not depend
on the validity of unmodeled equilibrium selection arguments. Observe also that when
both principals choose to be active - case (c) - they both randomize, in contrast to the
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pure strategy equilibria that are typically the focus in common agency games. This has
observable implications. The agent in our equilibrium in (c) does indeed select the action
of the “losing” principal with positive probability. Nevertheless, similar to the finding in
the common agency literature, the “losing” principal ends up with 0 expected payoff, while
the “winning” principal gets the difference between the surplus generated by the two ideal
actions of the principals.
It may seem at this point that expected payoffs stated in part (c) do not depend on
whether efforts translate to rewards or punishment. This is only partly correct. Whether its
a reward or a punishment environment determines the value of γ, which in turn potentially
affects willingness. So if reward and punishment both lead to willingness values that fall in
part (c) of the theorem, then indeed the expected payoffs remain the same. But it could be
that with punishment we are in part (c) and both principals are active while with rewards
we are in part (a) and both principals effectively drop out. We discuss this further in section
3.6.
Observe that unlike in case (b) where the agent never selects the disadvantaged principal
2, in case (c) the agent does indeed select 2 with positive probability. Nevertheless, the
disadvantaged principal ends up with 0 expected payoff. In cases (b) and (c) rewards and
punishments both occur with positive probability in the corresponding equilibria.
3.4. Comparative Statics
We can now discuss how the equilibrium effort choices of the two principals relate to each
other and change in response to changes in the underlying parameters. For the following
result we focus on the case when both principals are active, W 2 > ϕ .
Theorem 3. Assume W 2 > ϕ. a) In equilibrium, the mixed strategy of effort used by the
advantaged principal weakly first order stochastically dominates that used by the disadvan-
taged principal, F 2 ≥ F 1.
b) The equilibrium mixed strategy of effort used by the advantaged principal for a higher
ν2 weakly first order stochastically dominates that for a lower ν2.
c) The equilibrium mixed strategy of effort used by the disadvantaged principal for a
higher W 2 weakly first order stochastically dominates that for a lower W 2.
Proof. Stochastic dominance of advantaged F 2 ≥ F 1
ν1 −min{ν2, γΦ2}+ µφk
ν1 + (µ− γ)φk ≥
µφk
ν2 + (µ− γ)φk(
ν1 −min{ν2, γΦ2}+ µφk
)(
ν2 + (µ− γ)φk
)
≥ µφk
(
ν1 + (µ− γ)φk
)
(
ν1 −min{ν2, γΦ2}) (ν2 + (µ− γ)φk)+ µφk (ν2 + (µ− γ)φk) ≥ µφk (ν1 + (µ− γ)φk)
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(
ν1 −min{ν2, γΦ2}) (ν2 + (µ− γ)φk) ≥ µφk (ν1 − ν2)
true if (
ν2 + (µ− γ)φk
)
≥ µφk(
ν2 − γφk
)
≥ 0
which is true in the domain φk ≤W 2 = min{Φ2, ν2/γ}]
The theorem describes the intuitive result that making the principals more similar, by
increasing ν2 or W 2 results in more aggressive competition between them. Observe that
this is true irrespective of whether effort translates to punishments as opposed to rewards
(the parameter µ).
3.5. Joining results: Two masters or one?
In a variety of settings agents have the ability to choose which groups to join. We can
use the results from section 3.3 to endogenize this choice. To do so, we extend the basic
game of section 3 by supposing that prior to playing that game the agent chooses one of
the two principals or both or neither, to join. Joining with principal k provides an additive
benefit of bk > 0 where b1 ≥ b2. Following this decision the basic game is played between
the agent and the subset of principals with whom the agent has joined.8 A subgame perfect
equilibrium of this supergame is an equilibrium of the basic game corresponding to each
subset of principals together with a choice of a subset of principals by the agent with the
property that the utility from the supergame plus the benefit of joining the principals is
maximized. Since each basic game has an equilibrium, the existence of a subgame perfect
equilibrium of the supergame game follows immediately.
Theorem 4. With rewards both principals are joined. With punishment:
(a) if W 1 < ϕ then both groups are joined;
(b) IfW 1 > ϕ > W 2 then: if b1 > cpib/(pib−pi) both groups are joined; if b1 < cpib/(pib−pi)
then only the disadvantaged principal is joined.
(c) If W 2 > ϕ, then if λΦ2 ≤ b2 both principals are joined.
(d) If W 2 > ϕ, for fixed values of the other parameters there exists λ such that for λ > λ
only the advantaged principal is joined if b1 > cpib/(pib − pi) and none of the principals is
joined otherwise.
8Strictly speaking the basic game is defined only for the case of two principals. If the agent joins one
principal the obvious resulting game has the same cost, utility and signal functions as the two-principal
game.
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Proof. First consider equilibrium where only principal k is joined. If W k < ϕ that principal
will not bid so the agent gets bk. If W k > ϕ then he is paid just enough to be indifferent
between 0 and k, that is the principal provides effort c/ [λ(pib − pi)] and if the agent chooses
inaction in the reward case receives bk + (1 − pib)c/(pib − pi) and in the punishment case
bk − pibc/(pib − pi)
With rewards, note first that the agent gets 0 from not joining any group. Now consider
the case of W 1 < ϕ. He gets bk from joining group k alone and by Theorem 2, gets
b1 + b2 from joining both. Therefore he joins both. With W 1 > ϕ > W 2 the agent gets
b1 + c (1− pib) /(pib − pi) from joining group 1 alone, b2 from joining group 2 alone and
b1 + b2 + c (1− pib) /(pib − pi) from joining both. Again, the agent optimally joins both
groups. Finally consider the case W 2 > ϕ. The agent gets b1 + c (1− pib) /(pib − pi) from
joining group 1 alone, and b2 + c (1− pib) /(pib − pi) if he joins group 2 alone. If the agent
joins both groups then we are in the mixed equilibrium case. Observe that the advantaged
principal always chooses rewards no less than ϕ. The only choice of the disadvantaged
principal that is less than ϕ is when he selects 0 and in this case the agent chooses action
1. In other words, no matter the realization of rewards from the mixed strategies used by
the principals, the agent gets an expected reward of at least (1− pib)λc/ (λ(pib − pi)). So by
joining both groups the agent gets no less than b1 + b2 + c (1− pib) /(pib − pi). As a result,
the agent joins both groups.
Turning to the punishment case we first observe that if the agent joins only principal
k he would never choose a = −k because the alternative a = 0 has lower cost and equal
probability of punishment. So if W k < ϕ then φk = 0, a = 0 and the agent’s payoff is bk; if
W k ≥ ϕ then φk = ϕ, a = k and the agent’s payoff is bk − piλϕ− c = bk − cpib/(pib − pi).
(a) If W 1 < ϕ then by joining group k only there is no punishment and the agent
chooses 0 and gets bk ; if he joins both groups by Theorem 2(a) the situation is the same,
no punishment and a = 0 - thus he gets b1 + b2 > bk.
(b) If W 1 > ϕ > W 2 then if he joins group 2 alone, he gets no punishment and payoff
b2; if he joins only 1 he gets b1 − cpib/(pib − pi); if he joins both groups Theorem 2(b) says
he takes a = 1 and gets punishment piλϕ so his payoff is b1 + b2 − cpib/(pib − pi). So joining
both groups is always better than joining only group 1. Therefore, if b1 < cpib/(pib−pi) then
only group 2 is joined and otherwise both groups are joined.
(c) Suppose now W 2 > ϕ and λΦ2 ≤ b2. If the agent joins one principal then the
agent receives at most b1 − c. If the agent joins both principals let ξ be the equilibrium
expected cost of punishment. So the agent gets b1 + b2− c− ξ and the net benefit of joining
both principals is at least b2 − ξ. To establish the result we must show this is strictly
positive. As we are by assumption in the mixed case the utility of the advantaged principal
is v1 = ν1−γW 2 = ν1−min{ν2, γΦ2} ≥ ν1−γΦ2. As we have assumed λΦ2 ≤ b2 it follows
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that v1 ≥ ν1 − γb2/λ. Let ω denote the equilibrium probability that the agent chooses
the advantaged principal’s preferred action. Then since the disadvantaged principal gets
0 we also know that the utility of the advantaged principal is equal to the total benefit
received by both principals - equal to the expected value of the prize minus the expected
cost of the punishment: v1 = ων1 + (1− ω)ν2 − ξ/λ. Since v1 ≥ ν1 − γb2/λ it follows that
ων1+(1−ω)ν2−ξ/λ ≥ ν1−pib2/λ and we may rearrange this as pib2−λ(1−ω)(ν1−ν2) ≥ ξ.
Since b2 > pib2−λ(1−ω)(ν1−ν2) it follows that b2 > ξ, which as we showed is the condition
for the agent to strictly prefer joining both principals.
(d) Again we are by assumption in the mixed case. Hence there is a unique equilibrium
and for φk ∈ [ϕ,W 2], the disadvantaged principal gets v2 = 0 and the advantaged principal
gets v1 = ν1 − γW 2, and the cumulative distribution of effort level is
F k(φk) =
v−k + µφk
ν−k + (µ− γ)φk .
The only parameter here that depends upon λ is the lower bound ϕ = c/ [λ(pib − pi)] and we
see that as λ → ∞ we have ϕ → 0. Hence for sufficiently large λ we have ϕ < W 2/2. So,
for such large λ there is a positive number Q such the probability that principal k chooses
an effort level at least equal to W 2/2 is greater than or equal to Q. Hence the expected
punishment cost to the agent is at least λpiQ2W 2/2 which for sufficiently large λ leads to
arbitrarily negative payoffs. By contrast if a single principal k is joined the agent gets
bk− cpib/(pib−pi), for all such high values of λ. Further since b1 ≥ b2 the agent would prefer
principal 1. So for such values of λ the agent would only join the advantaged principal if
b1 > cpib/(pib − pi) and neither of the principals otherwise.
Our results show that the question of which groups to join in the standard rewards-only
common agency environment is trivial. The agent always joins both groups. With punish-
ment, group membership depends more subtly on the punishment and signal technology.
Consider first the intermediate case W 1 > ϕ > W 2 and b1 < cpib/(pib − pi). In this
case the agent does not want to join the advantaged principal because the principal will try
to punish him to induce the action 1 and this will cost more than the benefit of joining.
Joining both principals is the same - but the disadvantaged principal finds it not worthwhile
to try to induce the action 2, so joining just that principal brings a benefit. Notice that
the lack of commitment on the part of the principals plays a key role here: the agent joins
the principal who brings less benefit because that principal will leave him alone while the
advantaged principal would impose punishments inducing him to engage in costly effort.9
9Notice also that while we have set vk(0) = 0 this is just a normalization: zero effort by the agent could
well provide a benefit to the principals so that, for example, it could be that the benefit v1(0) = v1(2) >
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Excluding this case, suppose that punishments by the disadvantaged principal is limited
to exclusion from the benefits of joining a principal then both groups are joined. In this
case it must be that λΦ2 the greatest punishment that can be issued by the disadvantaged
principal is no greater than b2 the benefit of joining. Hence in all cases both principals are
joined. This is relevant to social groups in which punishment takes place through partial
exclusion from group activities and there is no fee for joining. So, it should not surprise us
if we find two social groups with competing demands on a member’s time to nevertheless
have a considerable overlap in membership.
By contrast, if severe punishments are possible at low cost then the competition between
the principals is damaging enough and it does not pay to join both. Here again inability to
commit on the part of the principals plays a key role. Although the agent is quite willing
to accept the cost of effort c(1) in exchange for the benefit bk the cost of the competitive
punishment by the two principals swamps any possible benefit of joining both groups.
Groups that can use violence cheaply to punish erring members would fit this category.
Violent gangs membership, by this logic, should exhibit little if any overlap.
3.6. Welfare
Needless to say, the agent prefers that the principals use rewards rather than punish-
ments. As the disadvantaged principal gets an expected utility of 0 regardless, he is clearly
neutral. What about the advantaged principal?
Theorem 5. Assume pi < 1/2, and suppose Φ1 > ϕ. Then the advantaged principal never
strictly prefers reward to punishment. If pi is sufficiently small then the advantaged principal
strictly prefers punishment to reward.
Proof. Recall that µ = 1 corresponds to punishment and that γ ≡ (1−pi)(1−µ)+piµ. We use
subscript r for the reward case and the subscript p for the punishment case - so for example
W kp = min{Φk, νk/γp}, where γp = pi. Since pi < 1/2 it follows that γp < γr. Suppose first
that W 1p < ϕ. Since W 1p ≥ W 1r we have W 1r < ϕ and so the advantaged principal gets 0
regardless of whether punishments or rewards are used. Suppose next that W 1p > ϕ > W 2p .
In this case with punishment the advantaged principal gets ν1− piϕ while with rewards the
advantaged principal either gets either ν1 − (1 − pi)ϕ or 0. So, the advantaged principal
does strictly better with punishment in this case. Finally suppose W 1p ,W 2p > ϕ. Then the
advantaged principal gets ν1 − min{ν2, γpΦ2} in the case of punishments. In the case of
rewards his payoff could be one of three. If W 1r < ϕ then it is 0, which is less than ν1 − ν2
v2(0) = v2(1) > 0 and νk = vk(k)− vk(0) in which case joining the advantaged principal and providing no
effort would be strictly better for both than joining the disadvantaged principal. Never-the-less the inability
to commitment on the part of the advantaged principal leads the agent to join with the lower value principal.
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since the latter is strictly positive by assumption. If W 1r > ϕ > W 2r then his payoff is
ν1 − (1− pi)ϕ. Since ϕ > W 2r we have ν2 < (1− pi)ϕ,and so again the principal prefers
punishments. Lastly if W 2r > ϕ then his payoff is ν1 − min{ν2, γrΦ2} which must be no
greater than ν1 −min{ν2, γpΦ2} since γp < γr. So, the advantaged principal never strictly
prefers rewards to punishment.
Now consider that as pi → 0 we have γp → 0 and γr → 1. Hence W 1p → Φ1 > ϕ. Hence,
we are either in the case W 1p > ϕ > W 2p where we already showed that the advantaged
principal does strictly better with punishments; or we are in the case W 2p > ϕ in which case
as pi → 0 the advantaged principal gets ν1 with punishments and ν1 − min{ν2,Φ2} with
rewards, so punishment delivers a strictly greater payoff again.
The intuition behind this result is that if you are going to win the contest it is better to
pay when you lose (punishments) rather than when you win (rewards). Nevertheless, notice
that rewards and punishments are both costly - it is only in equilibrium that rewarding be-
comes costlier. The result is interesting, especially because in real-world social aggregations
marginalization weighs more heavily than costly rewarding.
4. Compromise
In the canonical example inaction is preferred by the agent when c > 0 and this forces
the principals to bid actively for the favor of the agent. But for either principal k, inaction
is equivalent to the opponent’s favorite action - both in terms of utility and observation
(signal probabilities). We now wish to model the action that neither principal favors the
most (action 0) as a compromise, again in terms of payoffs and observation. We then
assume that action a = 0 yields each principal a payoff 0 ≤ ηk < νk that is in-between
those generated by the actions 1 and 2. Observationally, we assume that compromise
generates the bad signal for principal k with a higher probability than k, but lower than
−k: if the agent takes the compromise action 0 the probability of getting the bad signal 1
is pic with pi < pic < pib < 1.
A couple of remarks are due. First, the payoff structure in this section is different in an
important way to that in the canonical section. An example of the latter involves principals
competing for the agent’s time where if the agent chooses to devote his time elsewhere a
principal is unaffected by exactly where that time is spent. In this section we allow for
more externalities, in that as a principal, if an agent works for the other principal it hurts
you more than if he were to remain neutral (choose compromise). Consider, for instance,
a setting of civil conflict in which each faction, conditional on an agent not joining, prefers
he remains unaffiliated to joining the opposite faction.
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Second, the information structure in the canonical example is such that a principal
cannot tell if the agent chose 0 or sided with the other principal. Hence, the principals have
no ability to induce the choice of 0 instead of the action favoured by the other principal.
The information structure of this section, by contrast, allows principals to give incentives for
compromise. We are interested in whether this translates to the emergence of compromise
in equilibrium.
To keep things simple we focus on the case in which c = 0 so that the agent is indifferent
across all actions. We also assume that Φk > νk/γ so that the effort constraint does not
bind in equilibrium. As a benchmark recall from Theorem 2 what is the equilibrium in the
canonical model in this case: it is unique, it is in mixed strategies, the support for both
principals is [0, ν2/γ] from zero to the most effort principal 2 is willing and able to provide
to get the agent to choose a = 2 rather than a = 1, the disadvantaged principal gets zero
and the advantaged principal gets ν1 − ν2 so that the social surplus is also ν1 − ν2. With
our new assumptions about the compromise action, we get the following results:
Theorem 6. (a) If pic > (pi + pib)/2 then there is a unique equilibrium. In this equilib-
rium compromise is not used and the strategies and payoffs to the principals and agent are
identical to those in the canonical model.
(b) If pic < (pi + pib)/2 compromise occurs with positive probability in every equilibrium.
The equilibrium distributions have at most one atom for one principal at zero.
(c) If compromise is efficient in the sense that ν1 < η1 + η2, then as pic → pi the
probability that the compromise action occurs converges to one uniformly over equilibria.
Proof. The utility advantage of action k over the action 0 is
(1−pi)(1−µ)λφk−piµλφk+(1−pib)(1−µ)λφ−k−pibµλφ−k−[(1− pic)(1− µ)− picµ]λ(φk+φ−k)
which simplifies to λ[(pic − pi)φk − (pib − pic)φ−k]; it follows that the agent would strictly
prefer a = 0 to action k if and only if
φk <
pib − pic
pic − pi φ
−k ≡ βφ−k
Therefore he would strictly prefer a = 0 to both other actions if and only if
β >
φ1
φ2
>
1
β
.
The agent would strictly prefer both actions to a = 0 if and only if the condition above
hold with the inequalities reversed.
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Proof of part (a): If β < 1/β, which is equivalent to
pic >
pi + pib
2
the agent strictly prefers one of the two non-zero actions to a = 0 for any φ1, φ2 with at
least one positive effort level. Furthermore, for all such φ1, φ2, the agent prefers the action
k with the higher φk. Finally, with φ1 = φ2 = 0, the agent is indifferent across all three
actions. This means that following any pair of pure strategies by the principals in the first
period, the problem faced by the agent is identical to that in the canonical model with
c = 0. So, against any strategy of the opposing principal and any second stage equilibrium
choice of the agent, the payoff to a principal from a given effort level is exactly as in the
canonical model unless both effort levels equal 0. Now, in equilibrium the probability of a
tie at 0 must be 0, since one of the principals would be strictly better of raising his effort
slightly higher. The same set of all-pay auction arguments that were used for the canonical
example then apply directly to this case and deliver the same unique equilibrium.
Proof of part (b1) at most one atom at zero: Suppose that there is a positive atom at
φˆk > 0. Consider that the opponent cannot have a mass point at either
φ−k =
1
β
φˆk
where the agent is indifferent between choosing k and compromise nor at
φ
−k
= βφˆk
where the agent is indifferent between choosing −k and compromise: if there was an atom at
one of those bids one of the two principals would wish to break the tie by increasing the atom
slightly. Next suppose that −k’s equilibrium distribution has two gaps directly below each of
φ−k, φ−k. In this case k should lower the atom slightly. Suppose then that φ˜−k ∈ {φ−k, φ−k}
has no gap directly below it. Then if −k takes a sufficiently small neighborhood directly
below φ˜−k and moves it to a mass point above φ˜−k but sufficiently close then at trivial cost
−k will have either converted a loss to a compromise or a compromise to a victory. This
increases utility so is impossible. We conclude that there was not a positive atom in the
first place. It also cannot be that both principals have an atom at zero since then one of
them should increase the bid slightly to insure victory against the other principal’s atom.
Proof of part (b2) no compromise: Suppose there is no compromise on the equilibrium
path. Take a positive bid φˆ1 for principal 1 such that every neighborhood has a positive
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probability. Then any bid by 2 in the interval
βφˆ1 > φ2 >
1
β
φˆ1
results in compromise, hence 2 does not bid in this interval since there is no compromise on
the equilibrium path. Since there is no compromise on the equilibrium path any equilibrium
value of φ1 in the same interval must lose to any equilibrium bid by 2 greater than φ1 and win
against any equilibrium bid by 2 less than φ1. Since the set of higher and lower equilibrium
bids by are the same for any φ1 in this interval (as 2 does not play there in equilibrium) it
follows that the probability of winning or losing for equilibrium bids in the interval is the
same for all φ1. Hence only φˆ1can be an equilibrium bid: the entire support in the close
interval must be an atom at this point. But there are no positive atoms by part (b1) so
principal 1 must play zero with probability one The same reasoning applies to principal
2. Since both principals cannot have an atom so we conclude that any equilibrium must
involve compromise with positive probability.
Proof of part (c): In equilibrium no principal will bid more than ν1/γ. This implies
that against any equilibrium strategy of an opponent if k bids
φk >
1
β
ν1
γ
then at worst a compromise will occur. It follows that k’s utility in equilibrium is at worst
ηk − ((1− pic)(1− µ) + picµ) 1
β
ν1
γ
.
As pic → pi this converges to ηk because β → ∞. Consequently equilibrium social surplus
converges to η1 + η2 which by assumption is greater than v1. Hence if the probability of
compromise is bounded away from 1 then equilibrium social surplus could not converge to
η1 + η2.
The key implication of our results is that it is the observational features of compromise,
as opposed to the payoffs it generates, that has a first order effect on equilibrium outcome.
If compromise is observationally closer to the least favoured action then it has no impact
on equilibrium whatsoever, no matter how high the social gains compromise brings. On the
other hand, if compromise is observationally closer to the favoured action, then compromise
must occur with positive probability. In this case, if compromise is the efficient action,
this probability converges to one at the limit. Observe also that the equilibrium implica-
tions of compromise we derive are independent of whether effort translates into rewards or
punishment.
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5. Robust Inefficiency in Common Agency Games
In this section we confine attention to the case of rewards only (in our previous notation
µ = 0) to relate our analysis to the existing literature on common agency games. In the case
of rewards the information structure of the earlier sections is incompatible with standard
common agency games because we allow for only two signals although there are three agent
choices. Hence we now extend the rewards-only model to the case of three signals. This
makes the standard common agency game a limit as the noise in the signals vanishes -
or put differently we can regard the model of the current section as a perturbation of the
standard common agency game.
In the perturbed setting, in which a principal may mistakenly observe any possible
outcome, rewarding any signal now has a direct effect on the principal’s payoff. Indeed, most
equilibria described in Bernheim and Whinston (1986a) as using “non-serious” strategies
are ruled out in the presence of imperfect monitoring, hence the error free limit of our
perturbation makes a sharp refinement of the set of common agency equilibria. However, it
turns out that this refinement does not rule out certain inefficient outcomes. Therefore, such
inefficiency is not merely the result of miscoordination from not requiring principals to “put
their money where their mouth is.” On the contrary, such inefficiency seem characteristic
of common agency games.
Bernheim and Whinston (1986a) do not offer a precise definition of “serious” strategies.
They simply describe bids on actions that do not get selected in equilibrium and that do not
reflect the relative preference of the principal as not serious. The notion of truthful strategies
is clearly formalized, however, and basically requires a principal’s bid profile to reflect his
relative preference across the different actions. By contrast, equilibrium analysis of our
perturbation does not force principals’ bids to reflect their relative preference. Instead, it
ensures that all bids are relevant to a principal’s payoff since no matter which action the
agent takes the principal will be forced to pay up the bid with positive probability. In
short, while Bernheim and Whinston (1986a) formalized “serious” strategies by requiring a
principal’s bid schedule to reflect his relative preference, we do so by ensuring that no bid
is off equilibrium.
We find that when compromise is inefficient there is a unique equilibrium that in the
limit is efficient and is outcome equivalent to both the truthful equilibrium of Bernheim
and Whinston (1986a) and the natural equilibrium of Kirchsteiger and Prat (2001) in
the common agency game. However when compromise is efficient there are at least two
equilibria: one that in the limit is efficient and equivalent to the truthful equilibrium, and
one that in the limit is inefficient and is equivalent to the natural equilibrium. Hence from
the perspective of the noisy information structure considered in this paper when the truthful
and natural equilibria differ there seems to be no good reason to rule out either one.
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Since we wish to perturb complete information common agency games with three actions,
we need to have a model with three signals as opposed to the two we have used so far.
With two signals we assumed without loss of generality that rewards were given only for
a good signal - this enabled us to study a single level of effort. Here we allow for the full
three dimensions of effort possible with three signals. It turns out that in equilibrium the
principals never invest effort towards their least favored action, thereby effectively making
the principal’s problem two dimensional.
5.1. Rewards with Three Signals
Specifically, we continue to study two principals and an agent who can take three actions
a ∈ {0, 1, 2}. The payoff structure remains unchanged and we assume one-to-one transfers,
that is λ = 1. So action k 6= 0 is worth νk > 0 to principal k and action −k is worth 0
and the action 0 is worth ηk with νk ≥ ηk ≥ 0 so that principal k prefers the action k. We
continue to assume that ν1 > ν2, and continue to call principal 1 the advantaged principal.
In the appendix we show that the results here are robust to more general payoff structures.
For the agent we continue to work in the indifference case c(a) = 0 for all actions.
There are now three signals z ∈ A = {0, 1, 2}. The signal has probability 1−pi of “being
correct” in the sense that Pr(z = k|a = k) = 1 − pi and an equal probability of taking a
wrong value in the sense that for j 6= k we have Pr(z = j|a = k) = pi/2. We assume that
0 < pi < 1/2.
Principal k commits to a reward schedule, with reward Rk(j) ≥ 0 following signal j.
Recall that we have assumed that a unit of reward costs a unit of effort. We also assume
that the upper bounds on these effort levels are not binding.
Following the choice of a pure strategy by the two principals, Rk(j) for k ∈ {1, 2}, a
choice of a ∈ {0, 1, 2} by the agent gives him an expected payoff of (1−pi)[R1(a) +R2(a)] +
(pi/2)
∑
j 6=a
∑
k R
k(j). If a = k, principal k’s expected payoff is νk − (1 − pi)Rk(k) −
(pi/2)[Rk(−k) + Rk(0)], if a = −k it is −(1 − pi)Rk(−k) − (pi/2)[Rk(k) + Rk(0)] and with
a = 0 it is ηk − (1− pi)Rk(0)− (pi/2)[Rk(k) +Rk(−k)].
5.2. Two Types of Equilibria
We focus on two specific types of equilibria. The first one we label the no compromise
strategy profile. The strategies involve principal k choosing to reward only upon observing
signal k according to the distribution F k(r) where
F 1(r) =
(pi/2)r
ν2 − (1− (3pi/2))r , F
2(r) =
ν1 − ν2 + (pi/2)r
ν1 − (1− (3pi/2))r
both with support
[
0, ν2/(1− pi)]. The agent simply picks the action that offers the higher
reward and breaks ties in favor of action 1.
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We will show that the no compromise profile is always an equilibrium. In the limit as
pi → 0, principal 1 bids ν2 for sure and so the agent selects a = 1 with certainty too. When
compromise is inefficient in the sense that η1 + η2 < νk for both k, this is efficient and has
the same outcome as the truthful equilibrium of Bernheim and Whinston (1986a). When
compromise is efficient in the sense that η1 + η2 > νk for both k this is inefficient.
The second we label the −compromise strategy profile. Both principals use pure strate-
gies Rk(j) that reward both k and the compromise action. The rewards are given by
R1(1) = R2(2) =
ν1 − η1 + ν2 − η2 + 
1− pi
R1(0) =
ν2 − η2 + 2
1− pi R
2(0) =
ν1 − η1 + 2
1− pi
The agent picks the action that brings the highest reward if unique. In case of a two-way
tie between action 0 and k ∈ {1, 2}, the agent picks k. In case of a three-way tie the agent
picks 0. In this strategy profile, the principals reward their most preferred action as well as
the compromise action. There is no randomization by the principals, and the compromise
action is selected with certainty.
5.3. Main Result
Our next result implies that when compromise is inefficient only the no-compromise
profile is an equilibrium in the limit, and in this range it is efficient; but when compromise is
efficient then both the −compromise strategy and the no compromise profile are equilibria,
and the latter is inefficient in that range. In other words, equilibrium analysis cannot rule
out the aggressive no-compromise profile even in the presence of an attractive, efficient
compromise option.
Theorem 7. (a) The no compromise strategy profile is always an equilibrium.
For small enough pi
(b) if ν1 < η1+η2 and  and pi/ are sufficiently small the −compromise strategy profile
is an equilibrium
(c) if ν2 > η1 + η2 the no compromise equilibrium is the only equilibrium.
The proof of this result is in the Appendix.
5.4. Examples
To illustrate the content of Theorem 7 we discuss a slightly modified couple of examples
used in Kirchsteiger and Prat (2001). The number in brackets refers to the action chosen
by the agent in the relevant equilibrium.
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Game 1; efficient action is 1
1 0 2
Payoffs Principal 1 17 6 0
Principal 2 0 5 12
Truthful equilibrium (1) R1 12 1 0
R2 0 5 12
Natural equilibrium (1) R1 12 0 0
R2 0 0 12
(Limit of) no-compromise equilibrium (1) R1 12 0 0
R2 0 0 F 2(r) = 517−r , r ∈ [0, 12]
(Limit of) −compromise equilibrium None
Game 2; efficient action is 0
1 0 2
Payoffs Principal 1 17 11 0
Principal 2 0 7 12
Truthful equilibrium (0) R1 11 5 0
R2 0 6 11
Natural equilibrium (1) R1 12 0 0
R2 0 0 12
(Limit of) no-compromise equilibrium (1) R1 12 0 0
R2 0 0 F 2(r) = 517−r , r ∈ [0, 12]
(Limit of) −compromise equilibrium (0) R1 11 5 0
R2 0 6 11
The only difference between the two games is in the payoffs that compromise brings. In
game 2, compromise maximizes the social surplus while in game 1 it does not. The truth-
ful equilibrium tracks this change in the compromise payoffs since the principals’ relative
preference across actions changes across the games. Indeed, not only are the principals’
strategies in the truthful equilibrium different across the two games, but so is the action
chosen by the agent; he always picks the socially optimal action. However, notice that each
principal’s favourite action along with the payoff it brings remains unchanged across the
two games. Since this is precisely what matters in a natural equilibrium, it too remains
unchanged.10
10A natural equilibrium is an equilibrium of a common agency game in which each principal rewards
at most 1 action. Such equilibria always exist in common agency games and typically it is not unique.
Kirchsteiger and Prat (2001) identify a particular type of natural equilibrium that they call maximum-
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The limit of the no-compromise equilibrium closely tracks the natural equilibrium across
both games. The agent’s choice and principal 1’s strategy are identical. While principal 2’s
is not exactly the same, it does have the key feature that principal 2 chooses to reward only
one action, which is also his favourite. In this sense we believe that our analysis offers strong
support for the notion of natural equilibrium. By contrast, the limit of the −compromise
equilibrium is identical to the truthful equilibrium in game 2, while the former does not
even exist in game 1. From Theorem 7, we know that in game 1, for small enough noise, the
no-compromise profile is the unique equilibrium. This may look like an argument against
the truthful equilibrium, since in game 1 the unique limit equilibrium strategy profile of
the perturbed game does not resemble a truthful strategy profile at all. However, a closer
look reveals that the two are outcome equivalent, in that the outcome and the payoffs to
the principals and agent are identical. So while a limit equilibrium strategy profile of our
perturbed game does not always track the truthful equilibrium profile, a limit equilibrium
outcome does always match the truthful equilibrium outcome. In this sense, we believe our
analysis makes a case for truthful equilibrium too.
6. Conclusion
We study a common agency model in which two principals with conflicting preferences
attempt to influence an agent through costly effort. Our framework allows this effort to
translate into either rewards or punishments, the former common in political lobbying,
the latter being more relevant for competing social groups. Adopting the more realistic
assumption of noisy observation of the agent’s action delivers sharp equilibrium predictions,
in contrast to the common agency literature. If both principals care enough about their
favoured action, we find that they both randomize over effort in equilibrium. The outcome,
as a result, is random too, but in expected terms it delivers payoffs equal to each principal’s
marginal contribution to the social surplus, as in the Vickrey Clarke Grove mechanism.
Also, the more similar the principals the more aggressively they compete.
In the case the agent can choose which and how many groups (principals) to join, our
results show that we should expect overlapping group memberships in the case of social
groups, which discipline members through the threat of partial exclusion from group activi-
ties; while in groups which can cheaply punish members to an extent beyond withholding the
benefits of membership, say through violence, we should expect no overlap. With rewards,
such as in political lobbying, the agent would optimally join multiple groups. Relatedly, the
conflict equilibrium, which always exists and is typically unique when the principals’ preferences are not
aligned. In a maximum conflict equilibrium with two principals, each principal ends up rewarding the action
that brings the highest payoff. All our mention of natural equilibrium refers to this maximum-conflict
equilibrium.
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agent always prefers rewards to punishment. The principals on the other hand, if and when
they have a strict preference, prefer punishment. We find that whether the introduction of
a compromise alternative leads to less competition depends first on the signal technology
and then on how compelling compromise is.
We use our assumption of noisy observation to perturb the standard common agency
(rewards-only) model. The limit equilibrium prediction offers support to both truthful
equilibrium as well as the competing natural equilibrium. Since the latter is often inefficient,
this may offer a new perspective on economic and political activities such as lobbying.
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Appendix: Common Agency
We consider a more general payoff structure than that in the text. We continue to
assume that principal k prefers action k the most and there is no indifference. His values
from actions 0, 1, 2 are vk(0), vk(1), vk(2) ≥ 0. We assume that v1(1)+v2(1) > v1(2)+v2(2).
The case in the text is with vk(0) = ηk, vk(k) = νk ≥ ηk, vk(−k) = 0. As in the text, in
the no compromise strategy profile principal k rewards only the most preferred action k
according to the distribution F k(r) where
F 1(r) =
(pi/2)r
v2(2)− v2(1)− (1− (3pi/2))r , F
2(r) =
v1(1)− v1(2)− (v2(2)− v2(1))+ (pi/2)r
v1(1)− v1(2)− (1− (3pi/2))r
both with support
[
0, v
2(2)−v2(1)
1−pi
]
. The agent simply picks the action that offers the higher
reward and breaks ties in favor of action 1.
In the −compromise strategy profile both principals use pure strategies Rk(j) that
reward both k and the compromise action. The size of the rewards are given by
R1(1) = R2(2) =
v1(1)− v1(0) + v2(2)− v2(0) + 
1− pi
R1(0) =
v2(2)− v2(0) + 2
1− pi R
2(0) =
v1(1)− v1(0) + 2
1− pi .
The agent picks the action that brings the highest reward if unique. In case of a two-way
tie between action 0 and k ∈ {1, 2}, the agent picks k. In case of a three-way tie the agent
picks 0. Thus if the −compromise strategy profile is played the agent chooses compromise.
Theorem 8. (a) The no compromise strategy profile is always an equilibrium.
(b) For small enough pi and  with /pi > v1(1)−v1(0)+v2(2)−v2(0), the −compromise
strategy profile is an equilibrium if and only if vk(k) + v−k(k) < vk(0) + v−k(0) for both
k = 1, 2.
(c) For small enough pi and either vk(k) + v−k(k) > vk(0) + v−k(0) for both k = 1, 2 or
a = 0 is the least preferred outcome for at least one principal there is a unique equilibrium
- the no compromise equilibrium.
Proof. In what follows it will be useful to consider the following 4-element partition of the set
of all pure strategies available to a principal. Let Skp = {Rk(j)|Rk(0) = 0, Rk(−k) = 0} be
pure strategies that reward only the preferred action, Sko = {Rk(j)|Rk(k) = 0, Rk(−k) = 0}
be ones that reward only the compromise action, Skb = {Rk(j)|Rk(k), Rk(0) > 0, Rk(−k) =
0} be pure strategies that reward both and Skw = {Rk(j)|Rk(−k) > 0} collect the remaining
pure strategies, which assign positive reward the other principal’s favorite action (of course
such strategies could reward the other actions too).
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(a) With the no compromise strategy profile principal 1’s expected payoff is v1(1) +
v2(1)− v2(2), while principal 2’s expected payoff is v2(1). It suffices to show that no pure
strategy deviation can do better.
Skp : These strategies that reward only pure actions are of two types: those with
Rkp(k) ≤
v2(2)− v2(1)
1− pi
are in the support of the equilibrium distribution hence by construction principal k is
indifferent to the equilibrium payoff. For the remaining deviations with
Rkp(k) >
v2(2)− v2(1)
1− pi
similarly to the proof in section 3, it can be verified that these do not represent an improve-
ment for principal k.
Sko ; Again we may consider two types: those with
Rko(0) ≤
v2(2)− v2(1)
1− pi
may be compared to the pure strategy R˜kp(j) from Skp with R˜kp(k) = Rko(0). Notice that
R˜k(j) belongs in the support of the equilibrium distribution. Given −k’s strategy, deviating
to Rko(j) from R˜kp(j), either leaves the agent’s action unchanged (if the agent was selecting
−k) or induces the agent to select 0 instead of k. This also equalizes the expected cost to
the principal from using either strategy. Since principal k strictly prefers k to 0 and the
expected cost of the two strategies is identical, Rko(j) is not a profitable deviation. For the
remaining deviations with
Rko(0) >
v2(2)− v2(1)
1− pi
the expected payoff would be less than vk(0)− (v2(2)− v2(1)). To see why, note first that
with such an Rko(j) , the reward on action 0 is strictly higher than any reward offered by
principal −k in his mixed strategy. So the agent would pick action 0 with certainty, bringing
principal k an expected payoff of vk(0)− (1− pi)Rko(0) < vk(0)− (v2(2)− v2(1)). For k = 1
this is strictly less than v1(1)− (v2(2)−v2(1)) while for k = 2 this is strictly less than v2(1).
Skb : Consider first a deviation in S
k
b with R
k
b (k) < R
k
b (0). If R
k
b (j) is profitable then
so must Rko(j) ∈Sko with Rko(0) = Rkb (0) +  for a small enough . To see this, sup-
pose that with Rkb (j) and principal −k’s strategy, the agent picks 0 with probability q
and −k with probability 1 − q. Notice that since Rkb (k) < Rkb (0) and principal −k re-
wards only his own action, the agent would never pick k. Principal k’s expected payoff
is q
(
vk(0)− (1− pi)Rkb (0)− (pi/2)Rkb (k)
)
+ (1 − q) (vk(−k)− (pi/2) (Rkb (k) +Rkb (0))). If
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he were to deviate instead to Rko(j) ∈Sko with Rko(0) = Rkb (0) + , his expected payoff
would be q˜
(
vk(0)− (1− pi) (Rkb (0) + ))+ (1− q˜) (vk(−k)− (pi/2) (Rkb (0) + )) with q˜ ≥ q.
Now, if Rkb (j) is profitable then v
k(0) − (1 − pi)Rkb (0) must be no less than vk(−k) be-
cause otherwise principal k by playing Rkb (j) would be getting strictly less than his ex-
pected payoff from the no compromise profile. So, given that vk(0) − (1 − pi)Rkb (0) is no
less than vk(−k), for small enough the deviation Rko(j) is more profitable than Rkb (j).
But we already ruled out any deviation in Sko . So the principal k cannot do better with
Rkb (j). Now consider a deviation in S
k
b with R
k
b (k) > R
k
b (0). If R
k
b (j) is profitable then
so must Rkp(j) ∈Skp with Rkp(k) = Rkb (k) +  for a small enough . To see this, sup-
pose that with Rkb (j) and principal −k’s strategy, the agent picks k with probability q
and −k with probability 1 − q. Notice that since Rkb (k) > Rkb (0) and principal −k re-
wards only his own action, the agent would never pick 0. Principal k’s expected payoff is
q
(
vk(k)− (1− pi)Rkb (k)− (pi/2)Rkb (0)
)
+ (1 − q) (vk(−k)− (pi/2) (Rkb (k) +Rkb (0))). If he
were to deviate instead to Rkp(j) ∈Skp with Rkp(k) = Rkb (k) + , his expected payoff would be
q˜
(
vk(k)− (1− pi) (Rkb (k) + ))+ (1− q˜) (vk(−k)− (pi/2) (Rkb (k) + )) with q˜ ≥ q. Now, if
Rkb (j) is profitable then v
k(k)−(1−pi)Rkb (k) must be no less than vk(−k) because otherwise
principal k by playing Rkb (j) would be getting strictly less than his expected payoff from
the no compromise profile. So, given that vk(k)− (1− pi)Rkb (k) is no less than vk(−k), for
small enough the deviation Rkp(j) is more profitable than Rkb (j). But we already ruled out
any deviation in Skp . So the principal k cannot do better with Rkb (j).
A deviation in Skb with R
k
b (k) = R
k
b (0) is ruled out with a similar argument. Following
such a deviation, suppose the agent chooses action k with probability qk, 0 with probability
q0 and −k with 1− qk − q0. Principal k’s expected payoff is
qk
(
vk(k)− (1− pi)Rkb (k)− (pi/2)Rkb (0)
)
+ q0
(
vk(0)− (1− pi)Rkb (0)− (pi/2)Rkb (k)
)
+ (1− qk − q0)
(
vk(−k)− (pi/2)
(
Rkb (k) +R
k
b (0)
))
.
For this deviation to give an expected payoff greater than the no compromise profile
it must be that vk(k) − (1 − pi)Rkb (k) is strictly greater than vk(−k). If this devia-
tion is indeed profitable then so must Rkp(j) ∈Skp with Rkp(k) = Rkb (k) +  for a small
enough . The expected payoff from Rkp(j) would be q˜
(
vk(k)− (1− pi) (Rkb (k) + ))+ (1−
q˜)
(
vk(−k)− (pi/2) (Rkb (k) + )) with q˜ ≥ qk + q0. For small enough  the deviation Rkp(j)
is more profitable than Rkb (j). But again, we already ruled out any deviation in S
k
p . So the
principal k cannot do better with Rkb (j).
Skw: Finally consider a deviation, Rkw(j) Suppose, given Rkw(j) and principal −k’s strat-
egy, the agent chooses action k with probability qk, 0 with probability q0 and −k with
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1− qk − q0. Principal k’s expected payoff is
qk
(
vk(k)− (1− pi)Rkw(k)− (pi/2)Rkw(0)− (pi/2)Rkw(−k)
)
+ q0
(
vk(0)− (1− pi)Rkw(0)− (pi/2)Rkw(k)− (pi/2)Rkw(−k)
)
+ (1− qk − q0)
(
vk(−k)− (1− pi)Rkw(−k)− (pi/2)
(
Rkw(k) +R
k
w(0)
))
.
Notice that qk and q0 can both be positive only if Rkw(k) = Rkw(0). Let a ∈ {k, 0} represent
the action that gets positive probability if both qk and q0 are not positive. If both are
positive, then let a ∈ {k, 0} represent the action that generates the higher expected payoff
for the principal, the higher vk(a) − (1 − pi)Rkw(a). For Rkw(j) to be profitable, it must be
that vk(a) − (1 − pi)Rkw(a) > vk(−k), since otherwise the principal would be even better
off offering no reward at all, which we know to be false. Now consider a different deviation
Rk(j) with Rk(a) = maxj Rkw(j) +  and Rk(j) = 0 for j 6= a.
With Rk(j) his expected payoff becomes
q˜
(
vk(a)− (1− pi)
(
Rkw(a) + 
))
+ (1− q˜)
(
vk(−k)− (pi/2)
(
Rkp(k) + 
))
with q˜ > qk+q0. This is strictly higher than the expected payoff from Rkw(j). So if Rkw(j) is
profitable then so is Rk(j). But Rk(j) belongs to either Skp or Sko , which as we have shown
earlier contain no profitable deviations. Therefore there can be no profitable deviation in
Skw.
(b) Principal k’s payoff from the −compromise strategy profile is
v1(0) + v2(0)− v−k(−k)− 
2
− pi
2
(
v1(1)− v1(0) + v2(2)− v2(0) + 
1− pi
)
which is arbitrarily close to v1(0)+v2(0)−v−k(−k) for small  and pi. Increasing Rk(0) would
not change the agent’s choice while increasing the reward cost, hence it is not profitable.
Lowering Rk(0) would lead the agent to choose either k or −k. A switch to k would mean
that principal k’s payoff is no higher than
v1(0) + v2(0)− v−k(−k)− .
With /pi > v1(1)− v1(0) + v2(2)− v2(0) this would not be profitable either. A switch
to −k would of course leave principal k worse off since, by assumption, v1(0) + v2(0) −
v−k(−k) > vk(−k). Since lowering Rk(k) would also lead to a switch to −k, that would also
not be a profitable deviation. Finally, consider raising Rk(k). This would switch the agent’s
action to k but again bring principal k a payoff no higher than v1(0) + v2(0)− v−k(−k)− ,
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which would again be unprofitable with /pi > v1(1)− v1(0) + v2(2)− v2(0). Hence in this
case  compromise strategies comprise an equilibrium.
Now suppose vk(k) + v−k(k) ≥ vk(0) + v−k(0) for some k ∈ {1, 2}. Then principal −k
would do strictly better by setting his reward schedule equal to 0. His payoff would be
v−k(k), which is strictly greater than v1(0) + v2(0) − vk(k) − 2 . So the −compromise
strategy profile is not an equilibrium if vk(k) + v−k(k) ≥ vk(0) + v−k(0).
(c) The main work in proving this part of the theorem is to establish that for small
enough pi and if either vk(k) + v−k(k) > vk(0) + v−k(0) for both k = 1, 2 or a = 0 is
the least preferred outcome for at least one principal, then neither principal would assign
positive reward to the action 0, in any equilibrium. Once this is true, it is easy to see that
neither principal would reward the other principal’s favourite action in any equilibrium.
From this point the standard all-pay auction argument delivers the uniqueness result.
To establish that neither principal assigns positive reward to the action 0, in any equi-
librium, we go through the following steps. (i) We show that each principal must assign 0
reward to his least favorite action in any equilibrium. (ii) We then show that in equilibrium
it cannot be that only a single principal assigns positive reward to the action 0. (i) and (ii)
together prove our claim for the case when a = 0 is the least preferred outcome for at least
one principal. The case in which a = 0 is not the least preferred action for either principal
is established using the results of part (i) and (ii) in the subsequent part of the proof below.
(i) We first show that each principal must assign 0 reward to his least favorite action
in any equilibrium. To see this, denote principal k’s least favorite action as l ∈ {0,−k}.
Consider a strategy Rk(j) with Rk(l) > 0. Suppose, given Rk(j) and principal −k’s strategy,
the agent chooses action k with probability qk, l with probability ql and −l with 1− qk− ql,
where −l ∈ {0,−k} such that −l 6= l. Principal k’s expected payoff is
qk
(
vk(k)− (1− pi)Rk(k)− (pi/2)
(
Rk(l) +Rk(−l)
))
+ ql
(
vk(l)− (1− pi)Rk(l)− (pi/2)
(
Rk(k) +Rk(−l)
))
+ (1− qk − ql)
(
vk(−l)− (1− pi)Rk(−l)− (pi/2)
(
Rk(k) +Rk(l)
))
.
For this to be an equilibrium, Principal k’s expected payoff must be no less than vk(l),
which he can guarantee by offering no rewards at all. Let a ∈ {k, 0} represent the action
that gets positive probability if both qk and q−l are not positive. If both are positive,
then let a ∈ {k,−l} represent the action that generates the higher expected payoff for the
principal, the higher vk(a)− (1− pi)Rk(a). Let −a ∈ {k,−l} such that −a 6= a. For Rk(j)
to be played in equilibrium, therefore, we need vk(a) − (1 − pi)Rk(a) > vk(l). Consider
now the deviation R˜k(j) with R˜k(a) = Rk(a) +  , R˜k(l) = 0 and R˜k(−a) = Rk(−a) if
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vk(a)− (1−pi)Rk(a) > vk(l) and R˜k(−a) = 0 otherwise. This generates an expected payoff
of at least
q˜a
(
vk(a)− (1− pi)
(
Rk(a) + 
)
− (pi/2)
(
Rk(−a)
))
+ q˜−a max
{
vk(l),
(
vk(−a)− (1− pi)Rk(−a)− (pi/2)Rk(a)
)}
+ (1− q˜a − q˜−a)
(
vk(l)− (pi/2)
(
Rk(a) +Rk(−a)
))
where q˜a ≥ qa and q˜−a ≥ q−a. This expected payoff is strictly higher than that from Rk(j),
and therefore Rk(j) cannot be played in equilibrium.
(ii) Next, we claim that in equilibrium it cannot be that only a single principal assigns
positive reward to the action 0. To see this, consider by contradiction an equilibrium strat-
egy profile in which principal k is the only one to reward action 0 with positive probability.
Suppose one such pure strategy is Rk(j). Since Rk(0) > 0, by our finding above, 0 cannot
be principal k’s least favored action, which in turn must be −k. So Rk(−k) = 0. Suppose,
given Rk(j) and principal −k’s strategy, the agent chooses action k with probability qk, 0
with probability q0 and −k with 1− qk − q0. Principal k’s expected payoff is
qk
(
vk(k)− (1− pi)Rk(k)− (pi/2)Rk(0)
)
+ q0
(
vk(0)− (1− pi)Rk(0)− (pi/2)Rk(k)
)
+ (1− qk − q0)
(
vk(−k)− (pi/2)
(
Rk(k) +Rk(0)
))
.
For Rk(j) to be an equilibrium strategy at least one of vk(k)− (1−pi)Rk(k) or vk(0)− (1−
pi)Rk(0) must be strictly greater than vk(−k), since otherwise switching to no rewards at
all would be profitable. Let a ∈ {k, 0} represent the action that gets positive probability if
both qk and q0 are not positive. If both are positive, then let a ∈ {k, 0} represent the action
that generates the higher expected payoff for the principal, the higher vk(a)− (1−pi)Rk(a).
Now consider a deviation R˜k(j) with R˜k(k) = Rk(a) +  and Rk(j) = 0 for j 6= k. This
generates an expected payoff of
q˜
(
vk(k)− (1− pi)
(
Rk(a) + 
))
+ (1− q˜)
(
vk(−k)− (pi/2)
(
Rk(a) + 
))
where q˜ ≥ qk + q0, a profitable deviation for small enough . Since this is a contradiction,
we establish that in equilibrium action 0 cannot be rewarded by one principal alone.
So, if 0 is the worst action for at least one principal then neither principal would assign
positive reward to the action 0. Then, an almost identical argument to the uniqueness proof
of our result in section 3 establishes that the no compromise strategy profile is indeed the
unique equilibrium.
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Case in which a = 0 is not the least preferred action for either principal and vk(k) +
v−k(k) > vk(0) + v−k(0) for both k = 1, 2 : To establish that neither principal assigns
positive reward to the action 0, in any equilibrium in this case requires more work. From
(i) above we know that in this case principal k would never reward action −k and so
without loss of generality denote any relevant principal k’s strategy as (Rk(k), Rk(0)). Now
we show that (iii) a pure strategy (Rk(k), Rk(0)) where 0 < Rk(k) < Rk(0) cannot be
played in equilibrium (with positive probability). Furthermore, (iv) if the pure strategy
(Rk(k), Rk(0)) is played with positive probability then Rk(0) < v
k(0)−vk(−k)
1−pi . This in turn
means that (v) if principal k plays (Rk(k), Rk(0)), both strictly positive, in equilibrium,
then Rk(k)−Rk(0) < v−k(0)−v−k(k)1−pi . Then we show that (vi) if (Rk(k) = r,Rk(0) = p) with
0 < p < r satisfies (iii)-(v) and principal k is not better off playing (Rk(k) = r+, Rk(0) = 0)
for small enough , then principal −k must assign positive probability to strategies of the
type (R−k(−k), R−k(0)) with R−k(−k) > Rk(k) = r and R−k(0) + p ≥ R−k(−k). Our
final step (vii) of the argument shows that if (Rk(k) = r,Rk(0) = p) with 0 < p < r is
played with positive probability in equilibrium then the requirement in step (vi) results in
a contradiction.
We start by summarizing the situation. We are assuming that vk(k) > vk(0) > vk(−k) ≥
0 with vk(k) + v−k(k) > vk(0) + v−k(0) for both k = 1, 2. Again we wish to prove that no
strategy giving positive reward to action 0 can be played in equilibrium. From our earlier
finding we know that only pure strategies of the type Rk(j) where Rk(−k) = 0 will get
any positive probability. So without loss of generality we can refer to any pure strategy of
principal k that can be played in equilibrium as (Rk(k), Rk(0)).
(iii) Notice that a pure strategy (Rk(k), Rk(0)) where 0 < Rk(k) < Rk(0) cannot be
played with positive probability. With such a strategy, the agent would never select k, since
given that principal −k does not reward k, the total reward on k is strictly less than that
for 0. Principal k would do strictly better by deviating either to (0, Rk(0) + ) for a small
enough or to (0, 0). Deviating to (0, Rk(0) + ) ensures that the agent continues to not
take action k and choose 0 with as high a probability as before, if not more. Importantly,
principal k saves on the cost of reward following the signal k. Finally, if (0, Rk(0) + ) is
not a profitable deviation for all small , then it must be that vk(−k) ≥ vk(0)−Rk(k). But
if this were true then (0, 0) constitutes a profitable deviation.
(iv) Next we claim that if the pure strategy (Rk(k), Rk(0)) is played with positive prob-
ability then Rk(0) < v
k(0)−vk(−k)
1−pi . Suppose instead that (R
k(k), Rk(0)) is played in equi-
librium with Rk(0) ≥ vk(0)−vk(−k)1−pi . Suppose, given Rk(j) and principal −k’s strategy, the
agent chooses action k with probability qk, 0 with probability q0 and −k with 1− qk − q0.
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Principal k’s expected payoff is
qk
(
vk(k)− (1− pi)Rk(k)− (pi/2)Rk(0)
)
+ q0
(
vk(0)− (1− pi)Rk(0)− (pi/2)Rk(k)
)
+ (1− qk − q0)
(
vk(−k)− (pi/2)
(
Rk(k) +Rk(0)
))
which must be no greater than
qk
(
vk(k)− (1− pi)Rk(k)− (pi/2)Rk(0)
)
+ q0
(
vk(−k)− (pi/2)Rk(k)
)
+ (1− qk − q0)
(
vk(−k)− (pi/2)
(
Rk(k) +Rk(0)
))
If this is less than vk(−k) then he is better off deviating to (0, 0). If not, then it must be
that vk(k) − (1 − pi)Rk(k) − (pi/2)Rk(0) > vk(−k). In this case, the principal would be
better off deviating to (Rk(k) + , 0), for a small enough , since this generates the strictly
higher payoff of
q˜
(
vk(k)− (1− pi)
(
Rk(k) + 
))
+ (1− q˜)
(
vk(−k)− (pi/2)
(
Rk(k) + 
))
with q˜ ≥ qk.
(v) Next we use this to show that if (Rk(k), Rk(0)) ∈ Skb 11is played with positive
probability then
Rk(k)−Rk(0) < v
−k(0)− v−k(k)
1− pi .
To see this note that we already established that if the pure strategy (R−k(−k), R−k(0))
is played with positive probability in equilibrium then R−k(0) < v
−k(0)−v−k(k)
1−pi . Now, if
principal k were to play (Rk(k), Rk(0)) ∈ Skb with positive probability in equilibrium then
he should not profit from deviating to (Rk(k) + , 0). Suppose, by contradiction, Rk(k) −
Rk(0) ≥ v−k(0)−v−k(k)1−pi . Then Rk(k) ≥ Rk(0) + v
−k(0)−v−k(k)
1−pi > R
k(0) + R−k(0). But then
for such a strategy profile, the agent would never pick 0. So principal k’s expected payoff
would be
q
(
vk(k)− (1− pi)Rk(k)− (pi/2)Rk(0)
)
+ (1− q)
(
vk(−k)− (pi/2)
(
Rk(k) +Rk(0)
))
where qis the probability with which the agent chooses k. If this were less than vk(−k)
, deviating to (0, 0)would be profitable. If it is higher than vk(−k) then it must be that
11This involves a minor abuse of notation. Recall that Skb = {Rk(j)|Rk(k), Rk(0) > 0, Rk(−k) = 0}.
Since we have shown that in the current setting considering (Rk(k), Rk(0)) is without loss of generality as
in equilibrium Rk(−k) = 0, (Rk(k), Rk(0)) ∈ Skb means that Rk(k), Rk(0) > 0.
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vk(k) − (1 − pi)Rk(k) − (pi/2)Rk(0) > vk(−k). In this case, the principal would be better
off deviating to (Rk(k) + , 0), for a small enough , since this generates the strictly higher
payoff of
q˜
(
vk(k)− (1− pi)
(
Rk(k) + 
))
+ (1− q˜)
(
vk(−k)− (pi/2)
(
Rk(k) + 
))
with q˜ ≥ q.
(vi) Suppose (Rk(k) = r,Rk(0) = p) with 0 < p < r satisfies the conditions we have
derived so far to be used in equilibrium. We now show that principal k gets a strictly higher
payoff with (Rk(k) = r + , Rk(0) = 0) than with (Rk(k) = r,Rk(0) = p) for small enough
 against any pure strategy used by principal −k other than the type (R−k(−k), R−k(0))
with R−k(−k) > Rk(k) = r and R−k(0) + p ≥ R−k(−k).
To see this, pick any strategy of principal −k which satisfies either R−k(−k) ≤ Rk(k) = r
or R−k(0)+p < R−k(−k) and consider the change in agent’s choice when principal k deviates
from (Rk(k) = r,Rk(0) = p) to (Rk(k) = r+, Rk(0) = 0). Either the agent’s action remains
unchanged or it changes from either 0 or −k to k(importantly it cannot change from 0 to
−k). If the action remains the same then clearly the deviation is a profitable one since it
lowers principal k’s expected cost. If it changes from 0 to k then the change in principal k’s
expected payoff would be no less than
(
vk(k)− (1− pi) (r + )) − (vk(0)− (1− pi)p). We
know from earlier that for (Rk(k) = r,Rk(0) = p) to be played with positive probability in
equilibrium it must be that r − p ≤ v−k(0)−v−k(k)1−pi . So the change in principal k’s expected
payoff would be no less than vk(k) + v−k(k)− vk(0) + v−k(0)− (1− pi) . For small enough
 this must be positive since by assumption vk(k) + v−k(k) > vk(0) + v−k(0). Therefore,
in this case too, the deviation would be profitable. Finally consider the agent’s choice
changing from −k to k. The change in principal k’s expected payoff would be strictly
higher than
(
vk(k)− (1− pi) (r + ))−vk(−k). If this is positive the deviation is profitable.
If this is negative then (Rk(k) = r,Rk(0) = p) cannot be played with positive probability
in equilibrium, since principal k would be better off playing (0, 0). So we conclude that for
(Rk(k) = r,Rk(0) = p) with 0 < p < r to be used by principal k in equilibrium, principal −k
must put positive probability on a strategy(R−k(−k), R−k(0)) with R−k(−k) > Rk(k) = r
and R−k(0) + p ≥ R−k(−k).
(vii) We now complete the proof. For a given equilibrium strategy profile, suppose S˜kb
consist of all the strategies in Skb that get positive probability. LetR
k
(k) = sup
{
Rk(k) | (Rk(k), Rk(0)) ∈ S˜kb
}
.
If S˜kb is non-empty then by the argument of the paragraph above it must be that R¯
1(1) =
R¯2(2). Further it cannot be that there is a probability mass on some (Rk(k), Rk(0)) ∈ S˜kb
with Rk(k) = Rk(k). But then for principal k to not profitably deviate to (R¯k(k), 0),
principal −k must have a probability mass on a strategy (R−k(−k), R−k(0)) ∈ S˜−kb with
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R−k(−k) = R−k(−k).. This is a contradiction. So it must be that S˜kb is empty, meaning
strategies in Skb are not played with positive probability in equilibrium. Therefore in equi-
librium each principal must only be assigning rewards to their favorite action. Then, an
almost identical argument to the uniqueness proof of our result in section 3 establishes that
the no compromise strategy profile is indeed the unique equilibrium.
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